HOWARD W. HINTZ
Καθηγητοῦ 'Αμερικανικοῦ βίου καὶ πολιτισμοῦ

# PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

## I

The complaint is heard from many quarters that contemporary philosophy is dead —, dead in so far as its relevance to the living issues of the modern world are concerned. With growing insistence the charge is made that British and American philosophy particularly has withdrawn from the arenas of social, political and moral conflict. Philosophy in our time, we are told, has betrayed itself, deserted its ancient role and perverted its traditional purposes in its obsessive pre-occupation with technical logic and linguistic analysis. Modern existentialism in all of its forms (including the strident and confused outcries of the angry young men of Britain and the Beat Generation of America) is in large measure a protest against modern academic philosophy.

But it would be a mistake to assume that the protests are limited to the various groups of existentialists or to the professional and chronic baiters of all things academic or «intellectual». The fact is that the complaints are also coming from quite different sources —, from people themselves closely identified with academic and scholarly enterprises. Two recent examples of this type of criticism will suffice to establish the point. In an article appearing in the *New Republic* of June 17, 1957 Professor Clyde E. Fitch states (with particular reference to the recently published book, *American Philosophers at Work*): «This book demonstrates that the enterprise of philosophy in the United States in the year of our Lord 1957 fs dead». He laments the emergence of «a new scholasticism based not on theology but on science». He concludes his indictment of the dominant philosophic trends by predicting that «...the present cycle is finished. A philosophy which set out to abolish all meaningless questions and all meaningless propositions has succeeded only in reducing itself to meaninglessness. A

philosophy which set out to kill all superstition, all metaphysics and all of the wanderings of the mind has succeeded only in killing off philosophy ».

My second instance of this line of thought is a brief one. It appeared in the *London Observer* as the introductory paragraph in a « profile » of Karl Barth. « Philosophy in our time », says the anonymous author, « has been in voluntary retreat, withdrawing its claim to have anything to say about man's moral predicament and the human situation. Into the abandoned territory, theology has been expanding... ».

Comments such as these are representative and symptomatic of a sentiment which is becoming increasingly pervasive among both laymen and academicians at the present time. I am convinced that such protests, such accusations, such criticisms, whether valid or invalid, cannot in any event be ignored or evaded by present-day professional, academic philosophers. Even if it is not true that contemporary American and British philosophy is insignificant and irrelevant to the major issues of our time, we are still faced with the fact that this deep-seated and widespread impression of irrelevancy prevails. Whatever pertinence philosophy bears to the contemporary scene, therefore, seems to be escaping the notice of the vast majority of the people among whom we must include not only the average person, but the scholarly, professional and academically trained person as well. At the least, then, there has been a serious breakdown of communication between the philosopher and the public. This alone should be a basis of concern for the philosopher.

Three major questions need to be considered. First, how much truth is there in the charge that philosophy in America today is dead — has « reduced itself to meaninglessness? » Second, what is the value and significance, if any, of the more highly specialized and technical forms of philosophical inquiry? Third, in what ways can contemporary philosophy, in line with the great traditions of philosophy, relate itself more directly than it is now doing to the needs, conflicts and dilemmas of society as a whole?

In answering the first question it must be admitted, I believe, that with the notable exception of Bertrand Russell, there is no figure in professional British or American philosophy today who is conspicuously or significantly addressing himself to major social issues or is making any recognizably vital impact upon contemporary thought. In the United States, at least, there are indeed a few academic philoso-

phers (members of college and university Departments of Philosophy) who are dealing with current social, political or moral issues, but they are not widely known beyond small professional circles nor are they commanding the attention or exerting the ifluence which a half dozen philosophers did a generation or less ago. Now I would seriously doubt that the present lack is due to any dearth of basic intellectual power. I believe there is evidence to suggest the presence among us of minds of relatively high calibre, comparable as far as innate ability and potentiality are concerned, with the best produced a decade or a century ago. No, the paucity of outstanding philosophical figures at the present time is due, I submit, primarily to the dominant aititude toward its own function and purposes prevailing in professional philosophy today. For the fact is that the philosopher today is not encouraged by his colleagues or by his « academies » to address himself to living social issues nor is he particularly respected or commended by these groups when he is emboldened to do so.

Many members of the philosophical profession — perhaps the large majority — find themselves in a curiously paradoxical if not ambivalent position. As far as the pursuit of their own special discipline is concerned, they remain aloof from the affairs of the contemporary world. But as persons and individuals —, as members of the social order — they are highly critical of the trends and currents of that society. They are sharply at odds with the world in which they live but they seem to see little or no connection between their own philosophical pursuits, on the one hand, and the actual world in which they live, on the other. In politics, religion, education, literature, mass communication and a dozen other areas of modern culture the philosophers are disturbed by the conditions they see and are critical of the kinds of solutions propounded by the experts, the leaders, and the various professional specialists. In many instances, they have private answers and private solutions to the problems in question but they feel no special responsibility *as philosophers*, toward reversing the trends, correcting the evils, clarifying the issues, or suggesting better answers than the ones of which they are so sharply and perhaps justly critical. The point can be made more explicit by a few specific instances of issues with which philosophers *as philosophers* might well become involved.

Let us turn first to the field of politics, both national and international. Many philosophers of my acquaintance along with many other thinking people are deeply critical of prevailing policies and

practices. Among public officials of both high and low estate there is confusion of mind, ignorance of facts, ineptitude, inefficieney —, even stupidity, dishonesty, duplicity and a host of other deficiencies. In the field of foreign affairs we lament the absence of dynamic leadership and the lack of vision, foresight, courage, imagination and knowledge in the formation and application of policies adequate to the needs of the hour. In domestic matters we find a thousand faults in the way the affairs of government are conducted. Above all, perhaps, we bemoan the political indifference, ignorance, and intellectual confusion of the citizenry at large. Now there is an ancient branch of the philosophical discipline known as social or political philosophy and in this study such basic areas of philosophical inquiry as logic, epistomology, ethics, and even metaphysics are involved. The greatest philosophers of the past, and most notably Plato and Aristotle, recognized the immediate bearing of philosophy upon political matters and directed their thought extensively to such matters. But at the present hour it is a rarity to find a professional philosopher, in his professioual capacity, concerning himself in any way with social and political issues.

Let us turn next to the field of education. Virtually all philosophers, as members of university faculties are directly involved in formal, institutional education. Along with their colleagues in other Departments, many of them are outspokenly critical of current educational policies and practices particularly on the college and university level. They are dissatisfied with academic standards (or the lack of them), with teaching practices, with grading procedures, with ill-defined or undefined values and goals, and above all with the type of product sent forth by our schools and colleges. This critical attitude is indeed as it should be for there is perhaps no single segment of the social order with which philosophy in all of its aspects should be more directly concerned than the field of education at all levels. There is probably no single subject to which the philosophers of the past have addressed themselves more persistently than in the matter of educational principles, objectives and practices. And yet once again, most modern philosophers confine their criticism of contemporary education to informal observations expressed independently of their role as philosophers. In professional philosophical circles today it is a well hnown fact that the large majority of academic philosophers (we grant the notable exceptions) tend not only to ignore, but to disdain « Education » as a subject matter or academic discipline and to regard the Philosophy of Education as a subject matter and course of study which is beneath

their dignity as philosophers and unworthy of their serious attention. Colleges and universities throughout the nation find it extremely difficult to staff such courses with members of Philosophy departments, with people whose specialized training is primarily in the field of philosophy. The inevitable consequence, of course, is that such courses are given predominantly by people whose graduate training is in the field of Education itself, or in other social sciences. The ironical situation then arises that on the one hand the philosophers deprecate such courses and their subject matter, and on the other hand these same philosophers refuse to « degrade » their philosophical integrity by involvement with so allegedly inferior a type of discipline.

I have often posed the question as to what resolution of the paradox the philosophers would recommend. Should all schools and departments of Education be abolished, and along with them, all courses in « Education »? If we are disgruntled by the kinds of things done in many of the superficial courses designated as « Philosophy of Education », shall we remove all such courses from the curriculum? And if we should follow such a procedure, what would we propose as substitutes for our schools and departments of Education and for their relevant courses: Shall we ignore this area of formalized study altogether? Or should we transfer all this subject matter to the Philosophy Departments — and let the *real* philosophers deal with the material? As to the latter possibility, I have seen the suggestion that Philosophy of Education courses be given by Philosophy rather than Education Departments regarded with horror by philophy professors. They want no part of this academic excrescence, either in their own or any other department.

Is one to infer then that the people who look with such disdain upon Education or the Philosophy of Education are also of the mind that philosophy has nothing to say about education, that education lies beyond or beneath the pale of its interests and concerns? If so, this is a conclusion unique among modern philosophers, a view in no wise shared by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, Rousseau, Locke, Whitehead or Dewey — to name but a few. It is just possible that many of the shortcomings of American education today can be attributed to a lack philosophical insight and direction, or in other words, to the desertion by the philosophers of this major and crucial area of the social order. American education at all levels is suffering primarily from confusion with reference to basic values, objectives and purposes. It is precisely in this realm of fundamental clarication and

evaluation where the philosophical disciplines, above all others, must operate and where the trained and socially responsible philosophers are sorely needed. The same principle applies also in the fields of religion and theology, of ethics and of aesthetics.

## II

The fact remains that even our most advanced societies are currently afflicted by widespread moral, aesthetic intellectual and spiritual disorders. Fear, insecurity and frustration still beset large numbers of our people; the threat of war and mass destruction increases with each passing month; economic and material inequalities still pervade large sections of the world; most people still substitute superstition for religion; vast multitudes of people find little satisfaction in their work and not much more in their so-called play or recreation; human potentialities for joyous and creative living still lie largely unrealized; the cultural tastes and standards of the masses of people remain at a relatively low level; true freedom of thought and expression is still curtailed through a deep-rooted fear of truth itself; the great majority of people including those with university degrees refuse to think independently on the issues which most directly affect their lives and their destinies. Thus, the enumeration of the ills and deficiencies of our age could be extended indefinitely. It is no deprecation of the efforts and achievements of the specialists in the various fields of our complex culture to suggest that basic philosophy has some specific contribution to make to the solution of our problems, contributions most particularly in the direction of both clarification of issues and improvement of methodology.

The second main answer to the question of the philosopher's social responsibility is provided by the professional specialists themselves. A perusal of recent issues of periodicals and books in the fields of the sciences and social sciences will reveal a growing demand for greater integration among the various disciplines, less narrow specialization and more stress upon long-range goals and basic values. In specific terms, what many of these specialists are demanding of their own disciplines and of their own colleagues is a larger infusion of essentially philosophical elements into those various lines of study and inquiry which emanated from philosophy in the first place. Unfortunately, these pleas are not meeting with any great response from the professional academic philosophers at the present time.

To reduce the question to very concrete terms; what specifically should we expect the professional philosophers to do? Are we expecting them to solve all the proclems of modern society? The answer is a decisive «No». But we are putting some further questions to the philosophers themselves. Do they feel that philosophical issues are in any wise involved in the critical problems besetting modern society or that philosophy has any contribution to make to their solution? If the answer at this point is affirmative, then we have the right to expect philosophers to concern themselves at first hand with the vital and pressing issues of the time after the manner of significant and responsible philosophers over the past two-thousand and more years. We are asking them to concern themselves at all times with the main lines of inquiry most desperately needed by modern man and most closely identified throughout the centuries with the special philosophical enterprise, namely the search for truth as embodied both in empirical facts, and in values. And if it be said that this is precisely what contemporary philosophers are doing, inclnding those who are engaged in the most narrowly technical studies, the answer is that the term «truth», whether applied to facts or to values, must finally be conceived and interpreted in its fullest sense (as it has been in the past by the greatest minds in the philosophic tradition) as embracing the whole experience of man and as relating to the needs and aspirations of the human race in all its variety and complexity.

In other words, the work which philosophers do, however technical or abstract it may be in its higher reaches must sooner or later and by some means be related to the experience of all men. In their present-day efforts to identify themselves increasingly with science and scientific method, the philosophers should go the full way and emulate the scientists also to the extent of translating and relating the findings of the most specialized researchers to the ultimate uses of human society. For instance, any perusal of major medical and other scientific journals will reveal an element rarely evident in philosophical journals,—namely the effort to indicate either the immediate of long range significance and application of the most abstruse lines of inquiry to the needs and uses of society as a whole.

In seeking for a group or a movement upon which to lay the chief blame for the withdrawal of contemporary academic philosophy from the arena of social conflict I think it is a mistake to make a scapegoat of the analytical philosophers and of the analytical movement in general. They share the blame but they are by no means the sole of-

fenders. The fact is that the profession as a whole, including those members of it who disdain all identification with the analytical school is more or less afflicted with the same malady. The obvious symptoms of it are excessive caution, an obsessive desire to be « scientific » ( whatever that may mean ), an air of intellectual puritanism and aloofness, and an apparent lack of confidence in the general significance of their own discipline.

Where in contemporary American philosophy today can we find anyone with the spirit or outlook of a Whitehead, the strict mathematician and logician who dared to propound a vast and complete metaphysical system which explored the whole of reality? This system Whitehead knew to be inadequate, imperfect and limited. He recognized its weaknesses and deficiencies. But he propounded it nevertheless, for he believed that the germ of truth was contained in it and that it represented, at the very least, a fruitful line of approach to the nature of the physical universe and of the human entity. He believed that it provided a foundation upon which other philosophers could build ; a blueprint, a principle of organization, a set of hypotheses which could be examined, tested, corrected, and even discarded and replaced. It is one of the tragadies of modern philosophy, I submit, that no serious attempt has been made by subsequent philosophers to follow up on Whitehead's challenge.

Perhaps the whole problem reduces itself to what David Riesman describes as the « loss of nerve » among the intellectuals of our time. Too many of us academic philosophers, whether we be ethicists, logicians, analysts, metaphysicians or social critics, have lost our nerve in the sense that we are afraid to venture into the realm of first-order statements, of theories or propositions which : a ) may be found by our fellow philosophers to contain imperfections, limitations or fallacies and b ) may be looked upon as dangerous or subversive by certain reactionary elements in society at large.

Obviously, I am not proposing, in my answer to the question of what philosophers should do about meeting the most urgent intellectual and spiritual needs of modern man, that they should cease or even slacken their pursuit of technical and specialized lines of inquiry. But the basic question remains : what should philosophers do over and above — not necessarily instead of — what they are now doing ? Broadly speaking, they should at least be concerned with the application of the aims, methods and disciplines of philosophy directly to the major problems which beset mankind. They should do this in the present age

as other philosophers have done it in ages past. The specific ways in which philosophers can relate themselves to the life of our time are numerous. What is needed most is a newly awakened awareness of the scholars' social responsibility. Emerson succinctly defined the work and function of the true scholar and philosopher in *The American Scholar* : « The office of the scholar is to cheer, to raise and to guide men by showing them facts amidst appearances... and whatsoever new verdict Reason from her inviolable seat pronounces on the passing men and events of today, this he shall hear and promulgate ».

## III

In practical terms, the major problem which the socially responsible philosopher or scholar faces is one of communication. Assuming that every scientist, every scholar, every philosopher believes that any and every truth, however remote, irrelevant or abstract it may seem when first apprehended, has some ultimate significance and relevance to humanity as a whole ; — assuming this proposition, it follows that the next task is to discover this significance and this relevance and to reveal it to as many as may profit therefrom. This leads us directly into the matter of popularization.

Philosophers as a whole, along with other scholars tend to look disdainfully upon those of their members who « talk down » to the average man, who write and speak for the popular audience. The implication is that if a man can appeal to and be understood by the layman he must, ipso facto, be superficial, insincere or fraudulent. One of the worst things that can happen to a man's reputation among a considerable group of his professional colleagues is for his book or his lectures to reach a wide public. Inwardly they may envy him his fame and certainly his financial success, but outwardly, and especially within the scholarly fraternity they must raise their eyebrows. Let us pass over the amount of sheer professional jealousy there may be involved in this. Let us rather confine ourselves to the really honest and sincere aspects of this suspicion of popularization. Unquestionably much of what passes for intellectual or cultural fare in our modern mass media is the product of charlatanism in its worst forms. Much « popular » culture today as purveyed through paper-back books, television, periodicals, etc., is indeed pseudo culture, and to the extent that these forms of popularization are superficial, and misleading and create in their audiences a false sense of cultural awareness they are

a positive evil. But it is a mistake to lump all forms of popularization together. The interpretive scientific writings of a Waldemar Kaempfert or a William L. Lawrence are far from superficial or fraudulent. In the field of religion the books of Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich and Karl Barth are a far cry from the platitudinous, repititious palaverings of a Norman Vincent Peale. Yet all of the afore-mentioned theologians reach a relatively wide audience. Similar comparisions between worthy and unworthy forms of popularization could be drawn from every major field of thought and applied to all of the media of mass communication. The point is that the works of many genuine thinkers and scholars have always been and continue to be presented in such a way as to reach the understanding of vast numbers of non-professional readers. In the more rarefied precincts of philosophy itself, the ideas of many prominent philosophers of both past and recent times have reached, at first hand, vast numbers of literate and intelligent laymen. John Dewey did not write down to any audience but over a long pepioe of years he did manage to reach an impressively large public.

The sum and substance of my present argument is simply this; that an attitude of disdain or of indifference with respect to his own work toward that vast body of people who do not happen to fall within a particular charmed circle of the redeemed is inexcusable snobbery and irresponsibility on the part of any scholar.

But this is not to assert that every scholar must also be a popularizer. It is to say, however, that he must be serious about his work to the extent of his being concerned about its significance in the larger region of fundamental human purposes and needs. It is not enough that his intellectual pursuits should give him personal satisfaction and fulfillment. If a particular scholar is himself not inclined or suited to the task of translating his work to a form and language comprehensible to the layman or of seeing the application of the truths he unfolds to the life of society in general, then he should at least be concerned that some one else do this for him. Philosophy as well as the sciences needs some indivlduals whose specialty might well be the interpretation of complex or abstruse philosophic concepts to society at large. For example, articles are constantly appearing in our philosophical journals which are brilliant and profound in conception, and which contain truths and insights of the utmost potential value to society as a whole. But in their original form, most of these pieces would be largely incomprehensible or at least obscure to most people who lie beyond the charmed circle of the journal's limited circulation.

In this particular matter two distinct lines of effort should be undertaken: 1. to achieve a larger outreach of the journals themselves among an increasing number of non-academic and non-professional laymen who are not only deeply interested in philosophy but are sufficiently literate in the subject to read these periodicals with understanding and profit; (the British journals of this type, as we know, reach much farther into the non-academic public than their American counterparts); 2. to develop procedures for the presentation of significant philosophical ideas in forms suited to the comprehension level of literate and intelligent, albeit philosophically untrained laymen, and through media to which these laymen have ready access. In other words, the problem is in considerable measure one of translation and communication.

Another basic approach to the problem must be along lines of greater interest and activity on the part of philosophers in those areas of philosophy which in themselves bear more directly upon the critical issues of the social order. There is an urgent need for the pendulum to swing in the other direction and for an increasing number of younger philosophers to concentrate not only upon ethics and aesthetics, but even more particularly on social philosophy, philosophy of history philosophy of education *and* metaphysics. For example, as far as the present distribution of special interests is concerned, it is a frequently noted fact that there is a dearth of candidates (including graduate students) for the fields above mentioned. It should be remembered, in passing that philosophical analysis can be utilized just as appropriately in these fields as in any others. I can see no objection to having analytically oriented people moving into these fields. I can find strong objection to these subjects either being ignored or analyzed out of existence. It is this trend, this reading out of the philosophic scene of some of its most basic and legitimate interests, which has led to the nihilism, the defeatism, and the withdrawal from the contemporary scene of so much of contemporary philosophy.

## IV

All philosophy, by its very nature and definition, is now concerned as it always has been with one essential task, namely, the pursuit of wisdom in all aspects of life and experience. This enterprise in turn resolves itself into two major divisions: 1. the clarification of value concepts (which includes methods of inquiry and modes of communi-

cation), and 2. the specification of the kinds of empirical data necessary to the valid appraisal of value concepts as applied to particular human situations. There has never been a time when human society has not been in imperative need of both of these activities. The preseut time is certainly no exception. Our complex civilization cannot, in fact survive without the extensive and intensive pursuit of these enterprises. In our own time, to be sure, impressive work is being done by innumerable specialists to resolve the most crucial issues of the social order. This activity is being carried on by scientists of all types, by educators, by critics, lawyers, statesmen and a host of highly specialized scholars. In many instances the work is being done well; in too many other instances, it is being done badly. In all instances, it could be done better if the basic and parent discipline of philosophy were exerting a more direct and pervasive influence upon all of the subsidiary disciplines which have emerged from it.

What I am maintaining is that professional philosophers as a group must never lose sight of the humanistic and societal functions of their discipline. Somewhere and somehow the most specialized inquiries must touch the life of humanity, must have some bearing upon living human experience. It might even be conceded that those who pursue their inquiries into the more abstract levels of logical, epistomological or metaphysical theory need not necessarily be the same persons who indicate the wider significance or application of these theories. What we are demanding is that the profession as a whole keep itself continually mindful of social need and responsibility and that some philosophers at all times and in all branches of the discipline, assume the task of relating what they do and what others do to the life of society as a whole. Indeed, the philosophers as a group, through their professional organizations, might well undertake at the present time a long-range project designed specifically to develop new means and techniques for constantly enlarging the circle of men and women to be brought within the scope of philosophical communication.

I am not for a moment intimating that the philosophers of our time are to be expected to resolve all the conflicts of the modern world, to make all ignorant men learned, all stupid men intelligent, all evil men good, all corrupt men honest. What we do expect is that they at least become involved in these enterprises, and that along with members of other professions, they recognize a certain responsibility to society. The alternatives which confront man in the atomic age are

fairly clear, indeed clearer than they have ever been before. Man's very survival is dependent upon some resolution of the deepest confusions and conflicts which beset him. Mankind has a stubborn will to survive. Therefore some men, indeed an increasing number of men will address themselves to the most critical issues. These men will be philosophers or they will not be. They will or will not have the benefit of philosophical training and insight. The remedies to our ills, we believe, will be better remedies and bring about more effective cures if philosophers are involved in devising them. It may even be that no really adequate remedies are possible without the kind of thinking to which philosophy has been traditionally committed and to which it is presumably committed today.

In summary, the task of modern philosophy in fulfilling its essential purposes, resolves itself, as I see it, into the following major lines of emphasis:

1. At the undergraduate level, philosophy courses should be so constituted and presented as to attract an increasing number of students whose major academic interests lie in other major fields of study including the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities. In other words, there is urgent need for all those who are to assume positions of leadership and responsibility in the modern world to get the benefit of as much philosophical training as possible.

2. Philosophy departments should do all in their power to advance the trend already underway to cooperate with other departments and through inter-disciplinary courses and other means, to exert both a direct and an indirect influence upon the liberal arts program as a whole. In many leading colleges and universities members of philosophy departments have been enlisted to conduct courses in general science and in integrated social science programs, in contemporary civilization, and in general humanities curricula. The more we can bring about the cross-fertilization of philosophy with other disciplines the better.

3. Members of all academic departments should be encouraged in every way to maintain an interest in philosophical materials, to familiarize themselves with trends and developments in contemporary philosophy and to approach their own subjects from a philosophical standpoint. It is the business of philosophy departments, through the sponsorship of campus-wide lectures and forum programs and by other means to generate and to sustain over-all interest in the subject matter, the methods, and the objectives of philosophy.

4. Rather than expending less effort in specialized areas of research and study, philosophers need to expend more. But they must at the same time recognize their responsibilities to society at large and develop a deeper concern about the relevance of their work to basic human needs and about the application to the general welfare of the truths which as philosophers they uncover.

5. A larger number and a larger proportion of our academic philosophers should concern themselves more directly with a wide variety of contemporary social issues. They should do this not as economists, sociologists, psychologists, etc., or in the *same way* in which these specialists approach the same problems, but as *philosophers* making the unique and particular contribution which their discipline demands. In more explicit terms, this means that we need a larger proportion of younger people, including both present teachers and doctoral candidates who will specialize in Social Philosophy, Philosophy of History, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Education, and of course, Ethics and Aesthetics.

The crucial question to be raised in our time as in any age are the philosophic questions. Unless and until these questions are faced no adequate resolution of either private or public dilemmas can be achieved. These are the questions which deal with clarification of goals and values, with the adequacy of our knowledge, and with the procedures necessary to the attainment of the greater knowledge and clearer understanding of purposes and ends.

Thus in all the areas of vital human concern, in matters of private and public morality, of economics, of politics, of international affairs, of cultural standards, the basic questions which must be asked before any rational and satisfactory answers can be found are always of the same type. They are the philosopher's questions. They are always the most difficult of all possible questions. But they are also the inescapable questions. They are questions which ultimately resolve themselves into the issue of what men believe, and thus they fall into the two main philosophical categories of belief on the one hand and the grounds of belief on the other. The philosopher's ancient responsibility towards both of these categories remains as demanding as ever. Even while he examines the grounds of all beliefs, including his own, he must continue to propound new beliefs, recast old ones and render these likewise to the relentless tests of critical examination. This process is the very stuff of rational thought. It is the business of the philosopher not only to engage in this kind of clear, vigorous and fearless

thinking in his own right, but also to induce as many others as he can to do this kind of thinking as well. However slight the penetration of the philosopher's influence may be upon the minds of either the general public or its leaders, the philosophers cannot escape the responsibility of using every means at their disposal to make this penetration as deep possible. Increasingly the consiousness of our time must be brought to the realization that if we do not *think* we shall be destroyed.

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